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THE OPEC OIL-PRICING POLICIES
Vaman Rao
University of Missouri-Rolla
Rolla, Missouri

Abstract
The capital-theoretic model suggested for determining the pricequantity combinations does not hold in the case of most natural
resources, including petroleum, since the inelastic demand function
would vitiate the optimal solution. The specification of a dynamic
demand function, with necessary, attributes, no doubt, results in
a valid optimal solution in period t, but that could be achieved
only at the cost of sub-optimal solution in other periods.
If
the OPEC starts behaving as a discriminating monopoly, instead of
as a pure monopoly, the optimal solution is assured in all markets
and in all time periods.
The economists have, for long studied the

known at the time of analysis, although

world petroleum market as a competitive

further exploration holds the possibilities

market, analogous to the U.S. petroleum

of expanded reserves.

industry, which consists of a large number

discount rate or the interest rate, the

of firms, big and small, and which

producer would attempt to maximize the

apparently operates in a competitive market

discounted stream of total revenues (or

(Fisher, 1964; Erickson, 1968).

the total profits) he makes over the

As a

Given a constant

reaction to the events of the past few years,

periods till the resource is completely

both in the U.S. and abroad, the economists'

exhausted,

view has completely reversed to treat the

perfectly competitive market the price

OPEC —

of the resource will be growing at the

a loose association of a few major

(Hotelling, 1931).

In a

oil suppliers -- as a monopoly or a

discount rate.

collusive cartel (Adelman, 1972; Akins, 1973;

marginal revenue will grow at the discount

Danielson, 1976).

Since there is consi

In a monopoly market the

rate as an optimal solution (Weinstein

derable non-OPEC oil industry, a few others

and Zechhauser, 1975, Rao, 1976).

have attempted to characterize the world

output quantities will be given by the

oil industry as a leader-follower or a

respective demand functions.

dominant firm oligopoly, the 'strong'

Delbruck (1976) has shown that this approach

OPEC acting as the price-setter and the

The

doesn't work in the case of most of the

weak competitive fringe behaving as a

natural resources, including oil .

price-taker and adjusting its output

Certain

features associated with the petroleum

accordingly ( Cremer-Weitzman, 1975).

demand function do not lend the objective

In all these models the basic approach of

function with an optimal solution.

optimization is as follows:

He has suggested a dynamic function

The oil is

a non-renewable natural resource.

to get an optimal

It is

available in finite quantity which is

492

solution in one period at the cost of suboptimal solutions in other periods.

impose a quantity constraint

A

more satisfactory approach would be to
t

i t

i

<5

< 3 >

obtain optimal solutions in all periods.
This can be done by respecifying the
demand function(s)

The Lagrangian of the problem is given by

in a discriminating

monopoly situation.

Li =

l

p f q t (pt -c t ) ( i + r ) ' t + x ( Q - t V

In part II, the problem is presented in

(4)

brief to, explain, on the lines of
Delbruck, why the optimum solution is not

Applying Kuhn-Tucker conditions the

possible in the case of oil.

following relations hold.

Part III

presents an alternate model consisting
of re-specified demand functions in a

(5)

segmented market with price discrimina
tion to show that optimal solution is
possible in all periods.

Part IV

summarizes the discussion with a few

(6 )

comments on its social and international
Implications.

(7)
II

(8)

The objective of pricing strategy of a
non-renewable natural resource, petroleum,
is to maximize the discounted stream of the

(9)

total revenues, neglecting any costs of
production.

Assuming that the quantity

demanded in period t, (qt) , is a function

(1 0 )

of price of petroleum in that period,
(pt), and a constant ct , which allows for
(5) can be re-written as

shifts in the function due to changes in
the national incomes and population growth
the demand function can be specified as
follows:

qt " qt (pt ’ ct); ^
< 0
3qt

(1)

In view of (6) and for qt>0, the LHS of
(5a) would be a negative quantity.
is so because

The present value of the total revenues,

< 0 and | |

This

< 1 for

petroleum which has been estimated as

discounted by a constant rate of discount,

being between - ’2 and -*15.

r, is given by

There wouldn’t,

therefore, be any optimal solution to

p-v- “ t P f q t( P f ct><1+r)'t

the problem and the price-quantity forecasts

(2)

cannot be made using this model.
Since the total quantity of petroleum in
place (Qt) is known, it is customary to
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Ill

success and later failure of the conservation

Assume that OPEC, the organization of major

efforts indicate

oil suppliers,

of the demand functions, due to lower and

dominates the competitive

the backward and forward shifts

fringe to assign it a share of the market

expanded supplies respectively in the market.

and a market price.

The quantity to be maximized with the tsual
constraint would be

In the remaining

portion of the market the OPEC weilds a
monopoly power, even to the extent of
operating a discriminatory pricing policy.

P -V - = t tPl t .q1t(Pl t .p2 f ct) +

(12 )

It could do so because the demand functions
vary greatly in different areas.

Let

p 2t-q2t (plt >p2t ■k t) 1 <1+r)’t

there be, for example, two markets with
prices p^t and P2 t in markets 1 and 2 in
period t.

p^

is the same as the price

and the Langrangean for this problem would
be:

obtaining in the portion of the market
where the competitive fringe also operates.

L 2 = t [plt'qlt(plt’p 2 t ,ct) +

It is also assumed that intermarket trade
p2t‘q 2t^p lt,p2 ’^ t ^ (1+r)_t +

is not possible and that the OPEC can
enforce its dictate.

Let the demand

functions in the two markets be given by

MQ-*<ql t +q2t.>]

(13)

The K-T conditions for an optimum for this
problem are as follows:

(14)

(11 )
Quantity demanded in the first market
as a function of its price is obvious,
but that as a function of the price
obtaining in the second market needs a
little explaining.

Given a certain total

(15)

output in period t, constrained by the
capacity of production, the consumers in
the first market expect to buy a larger
quantity at p lt> if p2t is higher.

The

rationale for this behaviour is the
understanding that a higher than normal
p 2t means a lower than normal q2 t ,
leaves a larger output available in
market 1 making the demand function in
the 1st market shift upwards.

The

recent experiences about the initial

(16)

as it is reasonable to assure that the absolute
cross elasticities are much smaller than
(17)

the own elasticities of demand in the case
of petroleum.
The rates of growth of prices in the two
markets are given by

(18)

(19)

(20)
14 and 15 can be rewritten as

(22)

and

(14a)

Since the average revenue in the diseminating
monopoly is larger than the average revenue in
non-diseminating monopoly market,
(16a)

(unless

equalization of MR^= MR 2 results in
uniform price) the producers would get a
larger average price for the output sold.

where

It is obvious that IG<illt I > I£<i22tl implies

P

It

< p

2t.

The quantity changes can be

forecast only after the respective
quantities at which the equilibrium is
reached is known.
IV
Bar (14a) and (16a) to be valid the following
The model presented here has several

conditions have to be fulfilled:

favourable and unfavourable possibilities.
It is not unreasonable to think that
given the present status of the OPEC

(21)

and its economic strength, it can operate
as a discriminating monopoly, especially
when it is obvious that the elasticities
of demand for its product vary in

In actuality, this is not unlikely to be fulfilled,
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different areas of the world.

Under the

economic pressures that several countries,
both developed and the developing, are
subjected to, it can ensure zero inter
market trade.

If the new model results

in a two tier price system,

the developing

countries would welcome the pratice and
the OPEC will generate a large amount of
political support, at the cost of the
consumers in the other market where the
absolute

is relatively lower.

But

the two-tier price system, at least
mathematically, ensures an optimal
solution to the capital-theoretic model
of natural resource depletion.
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